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The plaintiff/appellant, John Panos, pursuant to Rule 24 (a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following
Appellant's Brief.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k).

This is an appeal from the Order

Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, of the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable
Anne M. Stirba presiding. That Order granted dismissal in favor of
the defendant, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issue is presented to this Court for review:
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the March 11,

1992 dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as opposed to a dismissal
without prejudice under Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue on appeal involves a legal conclusion by the trial
court.

That legal conclusion will be given no difference by this

Court and will be reviewed for legal correctness.

Alf v. State

Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The interpretation of the following statutory provision is
determinative of the issues on appeal.

The language of these

designated statutes of these designated rules is set out in the
Addendum to this Appellants1 brief, pursuant to Rule 24 (f) (2) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration;
Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case
This is an appeal from a final Order of the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the
Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding.

Judge Stirba granted the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On June 30, 1994, the plaintiff filed his complaint in

the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 940904176.
283).

(R. 279-

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint

asserting that a previous dismissal in Panos v. Smiths Food & Drug
Centers, Inc.. Civil No. 910901425 PI, Third Judicial District
Court, was a dismissal with prejudice disposing of the plaintiff's
complaint.

The plaintiff argued that the previous dismissal was a

dismissal without prejudice and did not dispose of his claim
against the defendant.

2

Hearing on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before Judge
Stirba on January 23, 1995.

At that hearing,

Judge Stirba

concluded that the March 11, 1992 dismissal was a dismissal with

prejudice under Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R.354-356).

This appeal followed (R. 357-358).

C.

Statement of Facts

1.

On or about February 21, 1991, attorney Anthony M.

Thurber filed the complaint

in Panos v. Smith's Food & Drug

Centers. Inc., Civil No. 910901425 PI, Third District Court, on
behalf of the plaintiff, alleging that the defendant was negligent
and responsible for the injuries the plaintiff sustained in a slipand-fall on June 30, 1990.
2.

(R. 2-5).

On November 13, 1991, the court sent an Order to Show

Cause to Thurber as to why the case should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
3.

(R. 8-9).

On December 11, 1991, Thurber appeared before Judge

Moffat at a hearing on the Order to Show Cause. In a Minute Entry,
after the hearing, Judge Moffat ordered as follows:
Counsel have until March 11, 1992 to settle this case or
file a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. If neither
are done, the case will be dismissed without further
notice to counsel. (R. 10).
4.

On or about March 11, 1992, the Court entered an Order of

Dismissal, which provided:
The court finds that the Certificate of Readiness has not
yet been filed and the file does not reflect that this
case has ben settled.
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Therefore, the court on its own motion orders that this
case hereby DISMISSED. (R. 11).
5.

On October 30, 1992, Thurber withdrew as counsel for the

plaintiff.
6.

(R. 12-13).

On January

14, 1993, Gordon K. Jensen entered

appearance as counsel for the plaintiff.
7.

his

(R. 15-16).

When Jensen received the litigation file from Thurber,

all it contained was a copy of the Summons and Complaint. No order
to show cause documents or the order of dismissal were included.
(R. 240-242).
8.

After Jensen entered his appearance as counsel for the

plaintiff, the case moved forward through discovery, with both
parties exchanging interrogatories and requests for production of
documents and taking various depositions, including the depositions
of the plaintiff and employees of the defendant.
9.

(R. 240-242).

At the completion of significant discovery, the defendant

filed a motion for summary judgment on liability issues. (R. 3839).
10.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant briefed those

liability issues.

Hearing on the defendant's motion for summary

judgment was scheduled for Friday, June 17, 1994 before Judge
Ronald 0. Hyde, sitting in for Judge Moffat.
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(R. 334-336).

19.

At that hearing, Judge Stirba concluded that the March

11, 1992 dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 354-356).

This appeal

followed.(R.357-358).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding that the March 11, 1992
Order of Dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule
41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The March 11, 1992

dismissal was a dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4-103
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
ARGUMENT
THE MARCH 11, 1992 DISMISSAL WAS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE UNDER RULE
4-103 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
IT WAS NOT A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE UNDER
RULE 41(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
Rule

4-103(2),

(3),

of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration provides as follows:
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been
served and filed within 180 days of the filing date and
absent of showing of good cause, the court shall dismiss
the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, move to vacate a dismissal entered under this
rule.
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
pertinent part as follows:
6

11.

At the June 17, 1994 hearing on the defendant's motion

for summary judgment, Judge Hyde informed counsel that his file
reflected that Judge Moffat had dismissed the plaintiff's case back
in March of 1992, when Anthony Thurber was representing the
plaintiff.
12.

(R. 334-336).

That was the first time Jensen or the plaintiff, who

attended the hearing, had heard of that prior dismissal. (R. 334336; 344).
13.

After discussion between Judge Hyde and both counsel, it

was decided that the appropriate way to proceed would be for the
plaintiff to file a motion to vacate the prior dismissal.

Judge

Hyde's ruling on this motion would govern further proceedings in
that case. (R. 334-336).
14.

Hearing on that motion was held on Friday, June 24, 1994

at 8:45 a.m. (R. 334-336).
15.

At that hearing, Judge Hyde denied the plaintiff's motion

to vacate dismissal, but declined to rule on whether the March 11,
1992 dismissal was with or without prejudice.
16.

On June 30, 1994, the plaintiff filed his complaint in

Civil No. 940904176 PI, Third District Court.
17.

(R. 334-336).

(R. 279-283).

The defendant moved to dismiss that complaint asserting

that the March 11, 1992 dismissal was with prejudice. (R. 286-287,
288-306).
18.

Those issues were briefed and a hearing was held on

January 23, 1995.

(R. 349-350).
5

(b) Involuntary Dismissal: effect thereof. For failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. . .
. unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue
or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directly conflict
in that Rule 4-103 specifically provides that a dismissal for
failure to prosecute

is without prejudice, while Rule 41(b)

provides that such a dismissal is with prejudice.
C&se law and factual background of this case support that the
March H /

1992 dismissal was without prejudice.

this case is clear.

What happened in

Through no fault of Panos or his current

counsel, his complaint was dismissed based on an order to show
cause. Panosfs previous lawyer had represented that the case would
be settled or a certification of readiness for trial filed within
three months of the order to show cause hearing.

For whatever

reason, Panosfs prior counsel did not comply with that deadline and
the case was dismissed pursuant to Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
It is clear that the dismissal was based on Rule 4-103 as a
part of this Court's civil calendar management system.

The order

to show cause of November

"No. 1",

13, 1991 was designated
7

clarifying that it was sent out pursuant to the court's internal
calendar management system.
Panos's current counsel entered his appearance in January of
1993 and the case has moved forward through substantial discovery
to the point where a dispositive motion was filed by the defendant
on liability issues.

Counsel for both Panos and Smiths moved the

case forward efficiently to the point of briefing and preparing to
argue Smith's motion for summary judgment on liability.

Only at

the hearing on Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment were present
counsel informed, for the first time, that the case had been
dismissed under Rule 4-103 over two years earlier.
The procedural circumstances of this case confirm that the
March 1992 dismissal was made under Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.

That rule established a procedure which

allows trial courts to manage civil case processing and is designed
to reduce the time between case filing and disposition.

The rule

states that if a certificate of readiness of trial has not been
filed within a specified period of time, the court shall dismiss
the case. That rule specifically provides that the dismissal will
be "without prejudice for lack of prosecution."
The Order to Show Cause was a form document sent out by Judge
Moffat's clerk. The Court's Order of Dismissal is a form document
incorporating the certificate of readiness for trial language of
8

Rule 4-103. Nowhere in any of those documents, including the Order
of Dismissal, does it state that the appellant's claim is dismissed
with prejudice. The language of Rule 4-103 makes it clear that the
proceeding is designed to move cases forward quickly. If an action
is dismissed under Rule 4-103, the action is taken off the court
docket, and the plaintiff is not prejudiced because he has the
ability to refile that claim within the applicable statute of
limitations or savings statute.
The March 1992 dismissal cannot be deemed a dismissal with
prejudice and on the merits. Issues were never joined. Smiths had
not even filed an answer at the time of dismissal.

To deprive

Panos his right to pursue this claim, through no fault of his own,
is unreasonable, unjust, and contrary to Rule 4-103 and decisions
of the Utah appeals courts.
Utah appeals court decisions do not support a dismissal with
prejudice for failure to prosecute, or for failure to obey a court
order, under the facts of this case.

In cases affirming such a

dismissal with prejudice, the parties had been engaged in ongoing
litigation for years and the plaintiff has showed inexcusable
dilatory conduct in moving the case forward.

For example, in

Country Meadows v. Department of Health. 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), there had been five years of inactivity on the case,
which the court deemed an "inexcusable abuse of the judicial

9

process."

In Maxfield v. Rushton, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the

plaintiff had made no attempts at discovery and had no medical
expert to testify on the morning of trial.

In Charlie Brown

Construction v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), the case had been inactive for three and a half years and
counsel for the plaintiff did not show up for any of the pretrial
conferences.

In Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App.

1992), the plaintiffs were given a number of opportunities to
designate expert witnesses and complete discovery. Still there was
no expert to testify at the time of trial, when a second motion for
continuance was made.

Dismissal with prejudice

under those

circumstances was affirmed because of the plaintiff's own failure
to designate expert witnesses and by abusing the opportunity to
move her case forward.
Finally, in Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d
1323 (Utah 1980), the defendant moved to have the plaintiff's
complaint set aside for failure to prosecute after an adverse bench
trial ruling. There had been no activity on the case for more than
four years before trial. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's denial of that motion to dismiss stating that, although the
plaintiff had not moved the case forward for four years, "it does
not appear that during the delay of which the defendant complains,
he made any motion or any effort to move the case forward nor to
10

discover why that was not being done,"

Id. at 1324.

While the

facts of the Romero case are not analogous to the facts of this
case, it is true that Smiths has never filed any motion for
dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Of course, Smiths could not

have done that in the first action because it never entered an
appearance nor filed an answer before the case was dismissed.
This case is most similar to Westinghouse Electric Supply Co.
v. Paul W. Larsen Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). In
that case, over a number of years, discovery was ongoing.

A

voluminous amount of documents were requested from Westinghouse
which, rather than producing them, told counsel for the defendant
that they could come and examine the documents.

The defendant's

counsel never made that examination and instead, served a motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute based on Westinghousefs failure to
deliver those documents.

The trial court granted the defendant's

motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
Utah

Supreme

Court

laid

out

the

In its decision, the

elements

to

consider

evaluating such a motion:
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the
business of the court with efficiency and expedition the
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move forward according to the rules and
the directions of the court, without justifiable excuse.
But that prerogative falls short of unreasonable and
arbitrary action which will result in injustice. Whether
there is such justifiable excuse is to be determined by
considering more factors than merely the length of time
11

when

since the suit was filed. Some consideration should be
given to the conduct of both parties, and for the
opportunity each has had to move the case forward and
what they have done about it; and also what difficulty or
prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and
most importantly, whether injustice may result from the
dismissal.
Id. at 878-79.
In evaluating those elements, this case had been pending for
just over one year at the time of dismissal.

It appears that what

happened is Panos's prior counsel filed the complaint and then
granted

Smiths an open extension

settlement discussions progressed.
fault in this case.

in filing

an answer while

Certainly, Panos is not at

Like both counsel, Panos knew nothing of the

1992 dismissal until the June 17, 1994 hearing.

As soon as he

found out that Mr. Thurber had withdrawn as counsel, he contacted
new counsel. New counsel entered his appearance and the case began
moving forward through discovery and dispositive motions.

Since

both parties have been engaged in litigation, the case has moved
forward efficiently, with both parties fulfilling their obligations
to the court.
prejudice

is

Under
caused

to

those circumstances, no difficulty or
Smiths

if

the

dismissal

prejudice. How could there be any such prejudice?

is without

Smiths did not

even know of the 1992 dismissal until the June 17, 1994 hearing.
Certainly severe injustice will result to Panos if the 1992
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dismissal is deemed with prejudice. His personal injury claim is
lost without adjudication.
As was the case in Westinqhouse, the circumstances of this
case are "unusual".

The final observations of the Utah Supreme

Court in Westinqhouse are relevant:
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch
and to move calendars with expedition in order to keep
them up to date. But it is even more important to keep
in mind that the very reason for the existence of courts
is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to
do justice between them.
In conformity with that
principle the courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgments where there is an
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to give
proper weight to the higher priority; and that under the
circumstances described herein, the order of dismissal
was an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 879. See also
App. 1989).

Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct.
CONCLUSION

Based on the law and facts set forth above, the March 11, 1992
dismissal was a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4-103 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

That dismissal was not

intended to be a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Order of the trial

Court, dismissing Panos's complaint with prejudice in Civil No.
940904176 PI, was error. That Order Granting Defendant's Motion to

13

Dismiss should be vacated and this case should be remanded to the
trial court for trial on the merits.

DATED this

in
t

, day of August, 1995.
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.

GORftON K. JENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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MORGAN & HANSEN
136 South Main Street, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM

Rule 4-103. Civil calendar management.
Intent:
To establish a procedure which allows the trial courts to manage civil case
processing.
To reduce the time between case filing and disposition.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) If a default judgment has not been entered by the plaintiff within 60
days of the availability of default, the clerk shall mail written notification to
the plaintiff stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in
the notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of
prosecution.
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been served and filed within
180 days of the filing date, the clerk shall mail written notification to the
parties stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the
notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of
prosecution.
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move to
vacate a dismissal entered under this rule.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; May 1, 1993; May 15, 1994.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "and absent a showing of good
cause" in Subdivision (1) and substituted
"shall" for "may" in both subdivisions.

The 1993 amendment added Subdivision (3).
The 1994 amendment added the requirement
of mailing written notification in Subdivisions
(1) and (2).

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d)
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule
41, F.R.C.P.
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Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315
Mitchel T. Rice, No. 6022
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN PANOS,
Plaintiff,

:

:
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTER,
INC.,

ORDER

*n chinas

:

Civil No. 9-3 00 01125 PI

:

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendant,
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Motion
for an Order Vacating the Order of Dismissal entered on March 11,
1992 of John Panes, Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, with
Gordon K. Jensen appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Mitchel
T. Rice appearing as attorney for Defendant Smith's Food and Drug
Centers, Inc.; and
After reading the Motion tc Vacate Dismissal and Memorandum in
Support thereof, and the Memorandum in Opposition -hereto, ar.d
after consideration of the argument of counsel fcr Plaintiff and
Defendant,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1.

The Motion for an Order Vacating the Order of Dismissal

reby denied.
entered on March 11. 1992 is hereby
Dated this

/

1994.

day of
BY THE COURT

n
\ l y - RONALD
"^"

0. HYDE
1
District Court Judge

raPTTT?TeATE

OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ^ f ^ d a y of June, 1994, I caused
a true and correct copy of the ORDER to be Hand-Delivered to th«
following:
Gordon K. Jensen
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE
136 South Main Street, Suite 721
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

*.

Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315
Mitchel T. Rice, No, 6022
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
Keams Building, Eighth Floor
13 6 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888

Deputy Cte^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN PANOS,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS,
INC.,

Civil No. 940904176 PI
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant,
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint of Smith's Food & Drug Centers,
Inc., Defendant in the above-entitled action, with Gordon K. Jensen
appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Mitchel T. Rice appearing
as attorney for Defendant Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc.; and
Azzer

reading the Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support

thereof, the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
rism.ss

the exhibits attached tc said Memoranda, and Affidavits,

ar.c a : : e r ccr.sidsrazicr. c : cr.e argume:
anc wSTrr.Car.-,

cz ccur.s6.

The Court finds that the Order of Dismissal entered by Judge
Richard H. Moffat on March 11, 1992, in John Panos v. Smith's Food
King, Civil No. 910901425, was made pursuant to Rule 4Kb) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and operated as an adjudication upon
the merits of the case, and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted;

2.

Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Smith's Food &

Drug Centers, Inc. is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
3.

Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. is awarded

its costs of the acti.on as are allowed by law.
Dated this

3 ^ day of

<t-£-(o f u ^ ^ > w (

, 1995i

BY THE COURT

ANNE M. STIRS.
D i s t r i c t Cou;rt

2

Jttscg_
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